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Abstract
We design and implement a field experiment to elicit and calibrate in-sample hypothetical and
actual bids given the presence of other goods and intensity of market experience. Using market
goods that possess characteristics beyond the norm but yet remain deliverable, bidding behavior
was consistent with theory. But we also observe the average calibration factor for hypothetical bids
in the auction with other goods to be more severe (0.3) than for the auction without the goods (0.4).
The results support the view that the calibration of hypothetical and actual bidding is good- and
context-specific. # 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Understanding whether people overstate their actual preferences for a good when asked
a hypothetical question remains an important issue in current policy debates over
environmental goods (e.g. how much would you pay to protect the Wyoming toad?).
Earlier work suggested that the average person exaggerates his actual willingness to pay
(e.g. Bohm, 1972; Bishop and Heberlien, 1979; Dickie et al., 1987; Shogren, 1990; Seip
and Strand, 1992; Neill et al., 1994; Carson et al., 1996). In response, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) blue-ribbon panel recommended
that hypothetical bids be deflated using a `divide by 2' rule unless these bids can be
calibrated using actual market data (NOAA, 1994, 1996). The NOAA rule has served an
ad hoc placeholder to motivate more research into the nature of calibrating hypothetical
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This paper implements a field experiment to further examine calibration by comparing
bidding behavior in a hypothetical and actual second-price auction for baseball cards ±
deliverable objects with an intangible quality. Baseball cards have many favourable
characteristics for a calibration exercise including familiarity, the ability to deliver, and an
abstract quality beyond the normal market good.
2 We run one sample with one card, a
second with one card among 10, and a third with one card bid on by sportscard dealers
presumed more experienced with the market than the general population.
The results suggest that bidding behavior is consistent with theoretical expectations as
the inclusion of other goods dampened mean hypothetical and actual bids, and market
experience reduced bid variance. But the results also show that calibration is sensitive to
the context of choice: (a) the presence of other goods ± hypothetical bids required less
deflation in the 1-good auction than the 10-good auction; and (b) market experience ±
hypothetical bids of dealers needed less deflation than non-dealers. While more stringent
than other estimates (e.g. Fox et al., 1998), our evidence supports the view the calibration
is good- and context-specific.
2. The good, the design, and the hypotheses
Our objective is to calibrate hypothetical and actual bids for 1-good with and without
the presence of other goods, and for different intensities of market experience. We
conducted three treatments at a sportscard show in Denver, CO in December 1995: the 1-
good, 10-good, and Dealer treatments.
2.1. The good
For the 1-card and Dealer treatments, the auctioned good was a Cal Ripken Jr. 1982
Topps Traded PSA-graded 9 rookie baseball card.
3 All treatments displayed the same Cal
Ripken Jr. card to ensure comparability of bids. An independent agency, Professional
Sports Authenticators (PSA), graded the Cal Ripken Jr. card to avoid complications of
participants not understanding the grade (i.e. substance and quality) of the card. We
1 Randall, 1997, p. 200) states that: ``[t]he calibration issue, it seems to me, is an audacious attempt to promote
a Kuhnian paradigm shift.... I would argue vigorously that the essential premise is unproven and the question is,
therefore, premature and presumptuous. The proposed new calibration paradigm is at this moment merely a
rambunctious challenger to the dominant external validation paradigm.'' One can interpret this statement as a
call for more work on calibration.
2 A baseball card is a piece of cardboard that serves as a proxy for more general preferences on the intangible
aesthetics of indirect athletics. Without attempting to explain the psychology of sports fans, people often like to
feel like they own a part of the team or moment: sportscards can help fulfill that preference.
3 Neill et al. (1994) compare hypothetical to actual values for goods with intangible qualities: watercolor
paintings and a map. Several methodological differences exist between our study and theirs: they examine
between-sample values, we consider in sample calibration; they do not address the impacts of other goods on
value; and their experiments were in the lab with students, our auctions are in a familiar marketplace with actual
collectors. Also, see Bohm's (1984) work on revealing actual values for public goods in field experiments.
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do not understand the substance of the good they are asked to value (Cummings et al.,
1986). Most collectors are familiar with the 1982 `Topps Traded' rookie card of Cal
Ripken Jr.: the sportscard collectors' bible, Beckett magazine, has recognized this card as
a `hot list' member for over 4 years with listed book value of $350 (October 1995).
Additionally, perusal of any sportscard show reveals Ripken's popularity and familiarity
with collectors, especially with his well-publicized record-setting 2,131 consecutive
games.
For the 10-good treatment, we used the Cal Ripken Jr. card plus nine other sportscards
(or sets of cards) that could act as potential substitutes or complements. Two other Cal
Ripken Jr. 1982 `rookie' PSA-graded cards, 1982 Topps and 1982 Donruss, served as
substitutes
4. The choice of substitutes was motivated by the observation that many
collectors view another rookie card of the same player as a substitute. Complements
included the complete set of 1982 traded cards without Cal Ripken Jr.'s card and Billy
Ripken's 1989 rookie PSA-graded card. We selected complements on the basis of many
people wanting to complete sets (e.g. 1982 Topps Traded without Ripken Jr.'s card); and
many collectors wanting to complete `oddball' sets, such as brothers, or double-play
partners; a Billy Ripken card fits both criteria. Five other goods were included in the 10-
card auction to provide additional substitutes; these were football cards consisting of
three Troy Aikman cards, one complete set (without Aikman), and one Michael Irvin
card. All cards were independently graded by PSA.
2.2. Experimental design
Our auction for the 1-good and 10-good treatments followed a four-step experimental
design: (1) inspection of the good(s), (2) hypothetical bid(s), (3) actual bid(s), and (4)
debriefing. In Step 1, monitor A approached a person entering the show and asked if he or
she would like to participate in a hypothetical auction that would take about 10 minutes.
If the individual agreed, the monitor briefly explained that we were hypothetically
auctioning off the baseball card(s) displayed on the table. The participant could pick up
and visually examine each card. All cards were sealed with the PSA grade clearly marked
on each cardholder. The monitor worked one-on-one with the participant and no time
limit was imposed on his or her inspection of the card(s). We did not give the participants
any financial incentives or gifts to participate, thus, we avoid any claims of the results
being influenced by `found money' effects. After a participant had examined the card(s),
Step 2 began.
In Step 2, monitor A gave the participant an instruction sheet that consisted of two
parts: (i) a short socio-economic survey (e.g. age, education, years trading), and (ii) a
bidding sheet (Experimental instructions are available on request.) The participant was
asked to submit a hypothetical bid stating the maximum that he or she was willing to pay
4 The difference between the 1982 `Topps Traded' and 1982 `Topps' cards is that the `Traded' card is an issue
focusing on `rookies' and players who are traded to a new team the previous season (or over the off-season),
while the `Topps' card is from a separate product line which includes the majority of players.
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exchange mechanism was a sealed bid second-price auction. Specifically, the bidding
sheet reported:
A sealed bid second-price auction will be used to determine the winner of this item.
Thus, if your bid of $X for this item is the highest bid and the next highest bid is $X-5,
you win this item but will only pay $X-5. Under this bidding mechanism it is best for
you to bid your true value for this item because overbidding may cause you to pay too
much and underbidding decreases your odds of winning the item.
Note: You will not be required to pay this amount and all bids are hypothetical.
Also, the winner will not receive this card.
Following earlier experimental auctions (e.g. Coursey et al., 1987; Shogren et al., 1994),
we use the second-price auction given its theoretical incentive compatibility properties
(Vickrey, 1961). While not flawless, the second-price auction has performed reasonably
well in revealing preferences for both induced and non-induced value auctions (see, e.g.
Kagel's, 1995 guarded but positive evaluation). After the participant filled out the survey
and hypothetical bidding sheet privately, he or she folded the bidding sheet and placed it
in an opaque box. The monitor told the participant that his or her bid would not be opened
until after show and that all bids would be destroyed when our research project was
complete. Monitor A then asked the participant to go over to monitor B at a second table
15 feet away for a follow-up auction.
In Step 3, monitor B told the participant that he or she now had the chance to actually
bid on the card(s) that he or she had just examined in Step 2. Monitor B gave the
participant a second bidding sheet for the actual auction. Again we used the sealed bid
second-price auction as the exchange mechanism. After the monitor answered all
questions about the auction, the participant placed his or her sealed bid into a second
opaque box. To guarantee that we did not get a second hypothetical bid monitor B asked
each participant to acknowledge their actual bid with a signature and valid telephone
number where they could be contacted. Care was taken to avoid contamination of the
results by any ordering effects (e.g. sealed boxes, monitors not handling or observing
bids). Cummings et al. (1995) found no evidence of an ordering effect in a dichotomous
choice setting.
Finally, in Step 4 monitor B debriefed the participant. The monitor explained that the
actual bids would be ranked, and the participant would be contacted within 3 days after
the show if he or she was the highest bidder. Monitor B also explained that if the
participant won the auction, he or she would receive the card(s) after he or she had sent a
check or money order for the amount of the second highest bid. After any remaining
questions were answered, monitor B asked the participant not to discuss the auction with
anyone else until after the show, and then thanked him or her for participating in the
project. Within 3 days the winner of each auction was notified by phone and when the
monitors received the checks they mailed out the cards.
The 1-good and 10-good treatments took approximately 12 hours to complete (from 9
A.M. to 9 P.M.). On the top of each hour the auction treatment was switched from the 1-
good to the 10-good treatment and vice versa the next hour. No participant took part in
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and 84 percent (93 of 111) for the 10-good treatment
5.
The Dealer treatment was similar to the 1-good treatment except that a monitor visited
each dealer at his or her booth the night before the sportscard show. The monitor first
gave each dealer an instruction sheet for the hypothetical auction, and then administered
the follow-up actual, upon the promise that they would not leak any information to
potential subjects. The treatment took about 2 h (from 6:30 to 8:30 P.M.), and the
participation rate was 91 percent (30 of 33).
2.3. Auction institution and economic hypotheses
Let bi
Hk;bi
Ak represent bidder i's hypothetical and actual bids for the Cal Ripken, Jr.
Topps Traded card, where subscript H and A represent the hypothetical or actual bid,
kone or ten represents the 1-good or 10-good case, and the superscript i is the bidder
(i1, 2,..., n). In the 1-good case, a persons's dominant strategy is to bid his or her true
value in the second-price auction (Vickrey, 1961). In the 10-good case, the strategy is
more involved since the bidder can win one or more goods. People in a simultaneous
auction can be viewed as either solo bidders wanting 1-good, local bidders wanting some
smaller set of goods, or global bidders who derive benefits from all the goods (Krishna
and Rosenthal, 1995). A solo, local, or global bidder's bid should equal his or her true
value for each good, depending on whether he or she wants 1-good or some combination.
Given a binding budget constraint, a person allocates his or her financial resources such
that bids satisfy standard marginal efficiency conditions ± the ratios of expected
marginal benefits and costs should be equated across goods. For more on multiple-
good auctions, see, McMillian (1994); McAffee and McMillan (1996); Melton et al.
(1996).
Given these two institutions, we compare the hypothetical and actual market price bids,
b2
jone and b2
jten j  H;A (i.e. the second highest price), to Beckett's October 1995 book
value for the cards. We estimate the percentage of market book value received in the
hypothetical and actual auctions. If the bids are not within a reasonable range of a market
benchmark, the bidders might not take the exercise seriously, and the results could be
viewed as problematic. We define a `reasonable' range as within 200 percent of book
value; other definitions can be easily accommodated.
We also consider two measures of internal consistency regarding the bids from our
auctions. First, we test how the availability of other goods affect hypothetical and actual
5 In the lab, more than one trial is often required before people understand the nature of the second-price
auction. We made a pragmatic choice to use a one-shot auction so that we could run the experiment on the floor
of the sportshow. To test whether subjects understood the second-price auction quickly, we ran a pilot study in
November 1995 at a similar sportscard show in Denver using the instruction sheet and experimental procedures.
On completion of the survey and bidding sheet, subjects were questioned about their understanding of the good
and the second-price auction. Nineteen people took part in the pilot study, and no one had any problem
understanding the auction, questions, or provisioning rule. Also a one-shot auction removes the potential for
upward bias stimulated by new information in an auction with affiliated common values (Milgrom and Weber,
1982). Baseball cards, especially for the dealers, can have a substantial common value component given the
going market price is well-publicized.
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possibilities, holding the binding budget constraint constant (i.e. the Le Chatelier
principle). Valuation research has supported this prediction for hypothetical goods
(e.g. Cummings et al., 1994). In our case, we should reject the hypothesis of
identical populations of Cal Ripken, Jr. bids in the 1-good and 10-good auctions.
The central tendencies of hypothetical and actual bids for the Cal Ripken, Jr. card in
the 1-good auction should exceed the mean bids in the 10-good auction,
 bjone >  bjtenj  H;A:
A second consistency check is that dealer bids ± those with more intense experience
with market prices ± will be more clustered than no-dealer bids. First, the card has a
common value element for dealers who plan on reselling the card; the common
value element for non-dealers should be less predominant as some are likely to want
the card for their collection not resale. Second, evidence from lab valuation suggests
that as bidders gain experience with the market and the going market price, the
variability of bids declines as many see the market price as an informative signal (e.g.
Grether, 1994; Plott, 1996). Bids cluster as bidders learn about the market within
which they trade. Therefore, we should reject the hypothesis that the bid variability
of dealers is similar to the variability of non-dealers in the 1-good auction,
Varbjone > Varbi
dealerj  H;A:
We consider three hypotheses to explore whether the context of choice affects that







Hdealer. First, for all three calibration functions, we test the notion that no
bias exists in hypothetical behavior, that is, 0; 1.0, where  represents the
regression intercept;  represents the regression slope coefficient on hypothetical bid
bi
Hone or bi
Hten; the regressand is the actual bid, bi
Aone or bi
Aten. Second, the no-bias
hypothesis implies that bids are symmetrical in that no extra bias exists when other goods
or intensity of experience are present in the value elicitation process. We use a likelihood
ratio test to determine if the coefficients generated from the 1-good treatment equal the
coefficients from the 10-good treatment; if bias exists, we should reject the hypothesis
that oneten and oneten. Finally, we test whether experience affects the calibration
function, We again use a likelihood ratio test to determine if the auction coefficients
generated from non-dealers are the same as the coefficients from dealers; we should
reject the hypothesis onedealer and onedealer.
3. Results and discussion
Consider the general pattern of bidding behavior in the three treatments. Table 1 shows
the mean and median bids and the demographic characteristics for participants in the 1-
good, 10-good, and Dealer treatments. A one-way ANOVA test indicates that the
respective samples for the three treatments do not differ by the socio-economic
characteristics listed in Table 1, thereby assuring that bids across treatments differ due to
treatment rather than demographic differences. The results show that the distribution of
hypothetical bids lies to the right of the distribution of actual bids. AWilcoxon matched-
pairs signed ranks test rejects equality of the distributions at the 1 percent level for each
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revealed by mean central tendency shows the ratio of hypothetical-to-actual overbidding
ranges from 2.2 to 3.5, depending on auction type. This degree of overbidding falls within
the range of 1.0±10.0 observed in earlier work on hypothetical±actual bidding (see,
Diamond and Hausman, 1994). The average overbidding exceeds that observed in Fox
et al. (1998) irradiated and non-irradiated pork auctions, but is lower than in Neill et al.'s
(1994) water color paintings and map auctions. These results reinforce the argument that
people overstate their actual willingness to pay. Table 1 also shows that hypothetical
bids from the 1-good auction required (0.39) less deflation than in the 10-good auction
(0.28).
3.1. Market benchmark
Our auction market prices are reasonably close to the listed book value from Beckett.
Table 2 presents the highest and second-highest hypothetical and actual bids for the Cal
Ripken Jr. TT card in the three treatments and Beckett's book value, $350 (as of October
1995). For the Ripken 1982 TT card, hypothetical bids captured 143, 100, and 93 percent
of the book value for the 1-good, 10-good and Dealer treatments while the actual bids
garnered 97, 71, and 73 percent of the book value. Table 2 also lists the top two bids for
the other 9-goods with their book values. Overall, the average percentage of book value
captured by the auctions was over 162 percent for the hypothetical bids and about 94
percent for the actual bids.
Table 1
Selected characteristics of auction participants
1-Card auction 10-Card auction Dealers
(N99) (N93) (N30)
Age
a 34.2 31.4 33.9
Gender (% male)
b 0.94 0.93 1.00
Education
c 3.9 3.4 4.1
Income
d 4.2 3.5 4.6
Experience
e 8.9 9.4 9.8
Average hyp. bid (stndard deviation) 142.02 (126.67) 91.71 (102.6) 208.80 (81)
Median bid 125.00 40.00 190.00
Average actual bid (standard deviation) 55.87 (82.9) 26.40 (52.2) 95.50 (88.1)
Median bid 5.00 0.00 92.50
Excluding 0s 75.00 35.00 140.00
Zero bids (%) 47 (47.4) 53 (56.9) 9 (30)
a Age denotes actual age in years.
b Gender denotes categorical variable (0±1): 0, if female, 1, if male.
c Education denotes categorical variable (1±6): 1grade 8 or less; 2high school graduate; 32 years college;
4other post-high school education; 54 year college; 6graduate school.
d Income categorical variable (1±8): 1less than $10,000; 2$10,000±$19,999; 3 $20,000±$29,999;
4$30,000±$39,999; 5$40,000±49,999; 6$50,000±$47,999; 7$75,000±$99,999; 8$100,000 or over.
e Experience denotes actual years involved with sports cards.
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Overall, the results suggest bidding behavior is broadly consistent with theoretical
predictions. First, the inclusion of other goods reduced bids, both hypothetical and actual
± mean and median hypothetical bids fell by 35 percent ($142.02±$91.71) and 68 percent
($125±$40), and mean and median actual bids fell by 53 percent ($55.87±$26.40) and
100 percent ($75±$0); excluding zero bids, the median fell by 53 percent ($75±$35).
Using a Wilcoxon test, we reject the hypothesis that the populations for bids, hypothetical
and actual, elicited in the 1-good auction were similar to bids elicited from the 10-good
auction at the 5 percent level or better (hypothetical; Zÿ2.61; actual; Zÿ2.06). The
observed decrease in values also falls within the range observed in previous studies on
hypothetical values ± 24±54 percent in Hoehn and Loomis (1993) and 60 percent in
Cummings et al. (1994). Second, using a Moses test, we also reject the equal variance
hypothesis at the 1 percent level for hypothetical and actual bids (hypothetical: M121;
actual; M96). The dealer's knowledge of the common market value seemed to reduce
the dispersion of their bids.
Table 2
Top 2 hypothetical and actual bids






1-Card Cal Ripken 1982 TT (1) $600 $350 $350
(2) $500 (143) $340 (97)
Dealer Cal Ripken 1982 TT (1) $330 $260 $350
(2) $325 (93) 255 (73)
10-Card Cal Ripken 1982 TT (1) $450 $300 $350
(2) $350 (100) $250 (17)
Cal Ripken 1982 Topps (1) $110 $80 $80
(2) $110(138) $75 (94)
Cal Ripken 1982 Donruss (1) $80 $50 $55
(2) $60 (109) $45 (82)
1982 TT Without Ripken (1) $70 $50 $65
(2) $70 (108) $45 (96)
Billy Ripken 1989 Fleer (1) $100 $50 $40
(2) $90 (225) $35 (88)
Troy Aikman 1989 Score (1) $110 $60 $45
(2) $100 (222) $55 (122)
Troy Aikman 1989 TT (1) $10 $5 $3
(2) $7 (233) $3 (100)
Troy Aikman 1989 Proset (1) $12 $7 $5
(2) $8 (160) $4 (80)
1989 TT wihtout Aikman (1) $15 $8 $6
(2) $13 (217) $5 (83)
Michael Irvin 1989 Topps (1) $10 $6 $3
(2) $8 (267) $5 (167)
Percent of book value (12 card mean) 167.9 93.84
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We use Tobit MLE and OLS to estimate the calibration functions
6. Also, we
include expansions in both square and square root of the hypothetical bid (hyp. bid)
and present these estimates when significantly different than zero at the 5 percent
level
7. Estimates are corrected for heteroscedasticity in all auctions except the Dealer
treatment.







dealer across the three different
auction. Models 1±2, 3±4, and 5±6 reflect the 1-good, 10-good, and Dealer treatments.
The OLS estimates suggest the calibration functions are concave for both 1-card auction
(dealer and non-dealer), suggesting that the relationship between hypothetical and actual
reported valuations is an inverted-U shape. However, since these estimates may be biased
and inconsistent, further investigation is warranted. In all Tobit specifications, the
quadratic and square root terms are insignificant, suggesting that a linear calibration
function is appropriate. Focusing on the Tobit estimates, we reject the no-bias hypothesis
(0; 1) at the 1 percent level for all treatments. We also reject NOAA's `divide by 2'
default hypothesis (0; 0.5) at the 1 percent level for the 1-good and 10-good
treatments, and at the 10 percent level for the Dealer treatment.
This result suggests that calibration might have to proceed good-by-good, in which




1-Card auction 10-Card auction Dealer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Constant ÿ8.3 ÿ20.0
* 0.25 ÿ0.19 3.1 6.8












Log likelihood ÿ559 ÿ334 ÿ448 ÿ234 ÿ210 ÿ136
Dependent variable is actual bid.
a T-statistics in parentheses.
** Significant at the 99 percent level.
* Significant at the 95 percent level.
6 Since the dependent variable (actual bid) cluster at a finite lower limit (zero), the OLS distributional
assumptions are violated and applying least squares to the data leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the
calibration function (Cragg, 1971). Since this is not a problem of censoring since bidders probably have a non-
negative valuation for each good, one of two techniques can be used to estimate the calibration functions: Tobit
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) or Heckman's two-step approach (i.e. Heckit).
7 We do not run a Box±Cox Tobit to test for non-linearities in the unknown calibration functions to avoid
imposing an artificial monotonicity conditions.
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potential solution is a two-step calibration process: collective hypothetical values are first
calibrated to private hypothetical values for a closely related private proxy (e.g. adopt-a-
species); and then calibrate the private hypothetical bids with private actual bids for the
private proxy. For example, Harrison et al.'s (1997) wetland calibration project used a
nature calendar, auctioned privately and collectively, to adjust for both free-riding and
hypothetical bias. Many questions remain, however, about whether one calibration
function can be transferred to a new context.
Using a likelihood ratio statistic, we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients from the
1-good treatment equal the 10-good treatment, oneten and oneten, at the 1 percent
level (
216.46). A Mann±Whitney test also rejects pooling the data at the 5 percent
level (Zÿ2.06). Additionally, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the
hypothetical bid is equal across the two auctions at the 12 percent level. To avoid
constraining the variances to equality across auction types we use the dummy variable
interaction approach within a heteroscedastic model. These results suggest the subjects
bidding in the 1-good treatment have a greater tendency to overstate the hypothetical bid
relative to bidding in the 10-good case.
To shed more light on the role of substitutes and complements in the 10-good
treatment, we group the other good into three categories: (1) strong complements (Billy
Ripken, TT set minus Cal Ripken); (2) strong substitutes (Cal Ripken Topps and
Donruss); and (3) weak substitutes (five football cards); and estimate their calibration
functions. All estimated slope coefficients from the Tobit model are significant at the 1
percent level. The slope coefficient for the two strong complements are 0.28 (Billy
Ripken) and 0.16 (TT minus Cal Ripken); for strong substitutes, 0.24 (Cal Ripken Topps)
and 0.23 (Cal Ripken Donruss); and for weak substitutes, 1.72 (Aikman Topps), 0.33
(Aikman TT), 1.38 (Aikman Proset), 1.11 (TT without Aikman), and 1.85 (Irvin Topps).
A likelihood ratio test suggests these goods do not have the same calibration function at
the 1 percent level 
29.14). The parameter estimates suggest that the Cal Ripken 1982
TT affects weak substitutes differently than strong substitutes and complements. The
calibration function is sensitive to the context of choice.
Table 4 shows that most bidders used a local or global bidding strategy, driving down
bids for each individual good; where we define four strategies: global bidders ± bids>0
for 6 goods or more; local bidders ± bids>0 for 2±5 goods; solo bidders ± bids>0 for 1
good only; and no bidders ± bids0 for all 10 goods. Table 4 also reveals, however, an
inconsistent pattern of hypothetical and actual bidding strategies in the 10-good auction.
Consistent bidding strategies are on the diagonal in Table 4; inconsistent strategies are off
the diagonal. Nearly 55 percent (54 of 93) of the bidding strategies were inconsistent.
Bidders systematically shifted from hypothetical global bidding to actual local, solo, and
bidding strategies. Using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test, we reject the null hypothesis
that the distributions of the hypothetical and actual bidding strategies are identical at the 1
percent level (Zÿ8.374). Inconsistent bidding strategies imply many bidders in the
hypothetical auction either violated the standard marginal efficiency conditions or viewed
the binding budget constraint as dormant. If this assertion was false, bidders would not
have reallocated their resources when their binding budget constraints were for real. A
hypothetical bidding strategy that satisfied the standard efficiency and binding constraint
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consistent.
We have mixed support for the null hypothesis that market experience does not affect
the calibration function, onedealer and onedealer. Using the likelihood ratio statistic,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis at any reasonable level of significance (
21.5).
Results from the Mann±Whitney test, however, reveal that the null should be rejected at
the 5 percent level (Zÿ2.77). Also, we reject the hypothesis of identical slope
coefficients across dealer/non-dealer auction types at the 5 percent level. More market
experience implies, weakly, that the adjustment required is less stringent ± knowledge
dampens but does not eliminate the tendency to overstate hypothetical bids.
4. Concluding remarks
We design and implement a field experiment to calibrate in-sample hypothetical and
actual values for an object with the desirable properties of being deliverable and familiar,
that still has some qualities beyond the norm. While the results support the view the
people overstate actual bids, the estimated calibration function to correct for this
exaggeration is both good- and context-specific, that is, other goods and market
experience matters. The calibration factors were 0.39 in the 1-good auction, 0.28 in the
10-goods auction, and 0.46 in the Dealer auction, all more stringent than the 0.6±0.9
range for irradiated meat products (Fox et al., 1998).
Good- and context-specific calibration suggests that one might be tempted to skip over
the hypothetical question and go directly to the actual auction. But for policy debates over
public goods, actual field auctions are constrained by one's ability to deliver the goods.
And while this might justify a common deflator such as NOAA's divide-by-2 rule, our
results show this could be off by 2±8 times ± a sizable difference if aggregated to regional
or national levels. Future research should explore whether (a) private goods can serve as
reasonable proxies for public preferences, and (b) the burden of calibration can be
reduced by clustering goods into a limited set of functions defined by the context of
choice.
Table 4
Hypothetical and actual bidding strategies in the 10-card auction
Actual bidding strategy
Global Local Solo No 
Hypothetical bidding strategy Global 21 30 4 40 65
Local 0 15 0 7 22
Solo 0 0 0 0 0
No 0 0 0 6 6
 21 45 4 23 93
Global: bid >0 for 6 cards or more; Local: bids >0 for 2±5 cards; Solo: bids >0 for 1 card only; No: bids0 for
all 10 cards.
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